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Abstract
Why have Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC countries) not replicated Western
economic success? We investigate the reasons behind the economic stagnation of LAC countries
for the past four decades. We utilize a nonparametric Malmquist productivity index for relevant
cross-country and over time productivity growth, technological change, and technical e¢ ciency
change comparisons. We document that productivity growth di¤erences between LAC countries
and Western countries can only partially be attributed to human capital di¤erences. We argue
that along with ine¢ cient production, di¤erences in civil, political, and economic policies and
institutions are promising factors in explaining the long-run economic performance of LAC
countries.
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1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, Latin American and Caribbean countries (hereafter, LAC countries)
have faced signicant development challenges including contracting productivity growth rates, high
ination, unemployment, skewed income distribution, and poverty. Along with the e¤ects of various
short-run crises, recent empirical research focuses on the long-standing economic stagnation of the
region without giving much attention to comparative analysis of productivity growth trends and
reasons behind the under-development of LAC countries. In this paper, we present a comparative
analysis of LAC countriesgrowth trends for 1966-2000 period and investigate the e¤ect of various
factors on the long-run growth performance of the region.
We rst compare long-run productivity growth performance of LAC countries with that of a
peer group of European and North American countries1 to provide a benchmark for what LAC
countries could have possibly achieved over the last four decades of the century. Such a comparison
makes sense since almost all of the LAC countries are populated by individuals of European descent
who established the Western culture and economic success2. We show that almost all of the LAC
countries perform unfavorably compared to North American and European countries in terms of
their productivity growth rates. In light of this fact, we further investigate the reasons those could
explain the poor economic growth performance of LAC countries.
Taking the United States as a benchmark country, we rst document that human capital dif-
ference is not the primary factor in explaining the productivity growth di¤erences between LAC
countries and Western countries. This is because while LAC countriesrelative human capital is
1Peer group of North American and European countries are as follows: United States, Canada, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
2Our idea here follows that of Cole et al. (2005). Using a neoclassical growth framework, they compare
long-run Latin American macroeconomic trends with a similar set of peer group of European and North
American countries.
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increasing over time, their relative labor productivity measured by GDP per worker is falling3.
Recent literature in explaining the long-run growth dynamics gives a particular importance
to institutions and provides well-established evidence that di¤erences in institutional development
among countries lead to sustained di¤erences in economic outcomes. In a seminal paper, Hall and
Jones (1999) argue that di¤erences in capital accumulation and output per worker among coun-
tries are driven by di¤erences in institutions and government policies, which they refer to as social
infrastructure. Later, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) and Easterly and Levine
(2003) have all reached a consensus that the political institutions are the fundamental cause of
economic growth. Lall et al. (2002) have also reached the same conclusion using a Malmquist pro-
ductivity growth index, yet they fail to recognize that the institutional quality endogenously a¤ect
the productivity growth rates of di¤erent countries. Using various institutional quality measures,
we investigate whether institutions can explain the poor economic performance of LAC countries
compared to that of European and North American countries. After controlling for the endogeneity,
we nd strong evidence that civil, political and economic policies and institutions have signicant
and positive relationship with the productivity growth and also positively a¤ect the technologi-
cal change (innovation) within the sample countries. However, they have no signicant e¤ect on
the technical e¢ ciency change (adaptation of existing technologies) component of the productivity
growth.
We utilize a Malmquist productivity index4 computed by nonparametric linear programming
methods for relevant cross-country and over-time comparisons. This index of total productivity
growth and the method to compute it, data envelopment analysis, has several desirable features
3For comparison purposes, our approach for taking United States as a benchmark country in relevant
comparisons follows Cole et al. (2005). They also conclude that human capital di¤erences are not the
primary factor in explaining Latin American TFP gap.
4Malmquist productivity index is rst introduced by Caves et al. (1982). Later, Färe et al. (1994) show
how this index can be computed using non-parametric linear programming methods.
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compared to those of traditional growth accounting techniques. Most importantly, this index can
be decomposed into two useful components, namely technological change and technical e¢ ciency
change. We report that innovation measured by the technological change component is the main
source of productivity growth in European and North American countries. On the other hand,
through international di¤usion of knowledge, LAC countries use the opportunity to adopt the new
technologies of Western countries and hence grow mostly due to the technical e¢ ciency change.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A discussion of the main economic trends of LAC
countries over the past several years is presented next to provide a background for our empirical
analysis. In section three, we provide a discussion of the analytic framework and the construction of
the Malmquist productivity growth index. In section four, we summarize the data and present our
main ndings. Section ve is dedicated for the empirical investigation of the intuitional factors those
could possibly explain the productivity di¤erences between LAC and Western countries. Finally,
section six concludes.
2 Relative macroeconomic trends in LAC countries
Most of the LAC countries are founded and populated by the individuals of European descent.
Table 1 shows that most of the LAC countries widely adopted European culture, religion, and
language. Spanish and English are among the native languages in both Latin America and the
Caribbean. Almost 81% of Latin Americans are white or mixed-white along with 39% of Caribbea-
nians. In addition, 92% of Latin Americans and 66% of Caribbeanians are a¢ liated with a Western
religion. These facts are consistent with those of Hoogvelt (2001). He argues that LAC countries
experienced substantial European colonozation and immigration, and Western culture has had con-
siderable impact on LAC countries. In most of the countries, European settlers nearly wiped out
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native cultures of the region. Therefore, following Cole et al. (2005), our basic assumption is
that individuals of LAC countries share similar preferences compared with those of European and
North American countries and have the same innate ability to innovate new technologies or to
replicate existing technologies. Hence, a comparison of LAC countries to those of European and
North American countries would provide a benchmark for what LAC countries could have possibly
achieved over the last four decades of the century.
Table 2 presents the long-run trends for various macroeconomic indicators for the sample LAC
countries and European and North American countries taking United States as a benchmark coun-
try. The mean GDP per capita in Latin America was 27% of the U.S level in 1966 and it fell from
23% of the U.S level in 1980 to 18% by 2000. Similarly, GDP per worker in Latin America fell
from 34% of the U.S level in 1966 to 23% by 2000. Caribbean countries also lost substantial ground
relative to the U.S during this period. The mean GDP per capita in Caribbean countries fell from
24% of the U.S level in 1966 to 21% by 2000. However, European countries increased their GDP
per capita from 66% of the U.S level to 70% during the same period. In addition, mean GDP per
worker in Europe increased from 65% of the U.S level in 1966 to 76% by 2000, although capital per
worker decreased from 106% of the U.S level to 82% during the same period.
The comparison is even more striking if we consider individual countries. Argentinas GDP
per capita was 53% of the U.S level in 1966 which was higher than Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain. It fell to 35% of the U.S level from 1966 to 2000. During this time, Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
and Spain all gained substantial ground and increased their GDP per capita above Argentinean
level. Therefore, Table 2 shows the long-standing economic stagnation of LAC countries and their
divergence from the rest of the Western countries.
Table 2 also implies that the economic stagnation of LAC countries cannot be attributed pri-
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marily to human capital di¤erences between LAC countries and European and North American
countries. The table reports that human capital in all LAC countries are catching up to the U.S
level. Specically, Latin Americas relative human capital increased by 41% between 1966 and 2000,
and Caribbeans increased by 47% compared to those of Europes relative human capital, which
increased by 11% and Canadas relative human capital, which increased by 6% during the same
period. In line with Cole et al. (2005), we conclude that human capital di¤erences between LAC
countries and European and North American countries do not play the primary role in explaining
the long-run economic performance of LAC countries. This is because while LAC countriesrela-
tive human capital is increasing over time, their relative labor productivity measured by GDP per
worker is falling. We will later consider alternative factors retarding LAC countriesdevelopment
process, in light of the conclusions of Hall and Jones (1999), Lall et al. (2002), Hendricks (2002),
and Cole et al. (2005). That is, we will analyze the e¤ect of ine¢ cient production, institutions,
and civil, economic, and political liberty on the long-run economic growth performance of LAC
countries.
3 Malmquist index of productivity growth
Current literature o¤ers two distinct methods to measure total factor productivity growth (TFP).
The rst method, also known as growth accounting, relies on the estimation of various production
functions and is the standard measurement tool since Solow (1957). Growth accounting method-
ology relies on accounting for the contribution of the growth of the input factors of a country to
the growth of its output. The residual part of the growth of output that cannot be accounted for
measures TFP growth. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Islam (1995) are two recent and
widely cited examples of cross-country studies using growth accounting techniques.
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On the other hand, TFP growth can also be measured using methods that estimate frontier pro-
duction functions. This methodology relies on constructing a best practice frontier using the data
on inputs and outputs, then measuring distances of countries to the frontier constructed. In these
methods, production frontier function can be estimated either parametrically or nonparametrically.
Parametric method or so-called stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) requires the specication of the
functional form of the production function and also relies on certain distributional assumptions.
Gong and Sickles (1992) demonstrates that SFA yields biased results in small to medium sized
samples.
In sharp contrast, using linear programming methods, the nonparametric approach and the
method of data envelopment analysis (DEA) does not require any specic functional or distribu-
tional assumptions. However, independent of the methodology employed to calculate the distances
of the sample countries from the best practice frontier constructed over the whole sample, TFP
growth can be computed using the Malmquist productivity growth index.
Among many others, recent country studies employing the Malmquist productivity growth
index include Färe et al. (1994), Krüger (2003), and Yörük and Zaim (2005). Färe et al. (1994)
compute the TFP growth for 17 OECD countries from 1979 to 1988. They conclude that the main
determinant of productivity growth in OECD countries is the technological change. Krüger (2003)
apply this methodology to a sample of 87 countries for 1960-90 period. Employing hazardous by-
products of production as undesirable outputs, Yörük and Zaim (2005) measure the TFP growth
of OECD countries from 1983 to 1998.
The Malmquist productivity index has two main advantages when compared to those of growth
accounting. First, this index can be decomposed into a technological change and technical e¢ ciency
change components accounting for innovation and catching-up respectively. Second, no price infor-
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mation on either inputs or outputs is necessary to compute this index. In this paper, we employed
the DEA methodology and nonparametric approach to compute the Malmquist index, primarily be-
cause it relies on much weaker assumptions compared to SFA. Färe, Grosskopf, and Russell (1998)
give a very complete survey on both the theory and the empirics of Malmquist indices; hence we
will here provide a brief account of the essentials of the Malmquist index.
The theoretical foundation of Malmquist productivity growth index is based on the output dis-
tance function Dto(x
t; yt) = inffxt; (yt=) 2 Stg, which is dened with respect to the production
technology such that fSt = (xt; yt) : xt can produce ytg5. Here, yt 2 RM+ refers to the vector of
outputs produced at time t and xt 2 RN+ refers to the vector of inputs used in the production of
outputs at time t. Given inputs, the output distance function measures the reciprocal of the maxi-
mal ray expansion of the observed outputs such that outputs are still feasible using the production
technology St.
If the observed production is on the production frontier at time t, such as at point (xt; yt), then
production is said to be technically e¢ cient and Dto(x
t; yt) = 1. On the other hand, if observed
production is interior to the production frontier, production is said to be technically ine¢ cient,
and Dto(x
t; yt) < 1. Hence, the output distance functions are the complete characterization of
technology and the point Dto(x
t; yt) = 1 represents the maximum production or the best practice
as dened by Farrell (1957).
Caves et al. (1982) denes the Malmquist index as the ratio of two output distance functions,
both of which are functional representations of a multiple-output and multiple-input technology
that requires information on input and output quantities. Formally, the Malmquist index is dened
as
M to(x
t; yt; xt+1; yt+1) =
Dto(x
t+1; yt+1)
Dto(x
t; yt)
. (1)
5This production technology is dened in Shephard (1970).
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It is also possible to break down the Malmquist index into technical e¢ ciency change (catching-up)
and technological change (innovation) components. Following Färe et al. (1994), the Malmquist
index can be redened as
M t+1o (x
t; yt; xt+1; yt+1) =
Dt+1o (x
t+1; yt+1)
Dto(x
t; yt)

Dto(x
t+1; yt+1)
Dt+1o (xt+1; yt+1)
Dto(x
t; yt)
Dt+1o (xt; yt)
1=2
(2)
where superscripts index two adjacent time periods. The ratio outside the brackets captures the
change in technical e¢ ciency between t and t+ 1, while the ratio inside the brackets captures the
geometric mean of technological change relative to t and technological change relative to t+ 1.
In equation (2), M t+1o > 1 implies a productivity growth, whereas M
t+1
o < 1 implies deteri-
oration in productivity over time. Similarly, technical e¢ ciency change and technological change
indices greater than one represent improvement in the respective measures, whereas values less
than one represent deterioration in performance.
The Malmquist index can be constructed by solving following linear programming problem for
any observation k0:
(Dt
00
o (x
t
0
k0 ; y
t
0
k0 ))
 1 = max 
s:t:PK
k=1 zky
t
0
km  yt
0
k0m m = 1; :::;MPK
k=1 zkx
t
0
kn  xt
0
k0n n = 1; :::; N
zk  0 k = 1; :::;K
(3)
where K indexes the number of cross-section units for each time period within the panel data, N
represets the inputs, M indexes the outputs, and zk is an intensity variable, which measures the
weight of each cross-section unit within the sample group. The weight is then compared with any
particular observation to determine the distance to the e¢ cient frontier. This linear programming
problem measures the output-based Farrell technical e¢ ciency of observation k0 relative to the
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reference technology at period t0, i.e. Dt
00
o (x
t
0
; yt
0
), for all (t0; t00) 2 f(t; t); (t; t + 1); (t + 1; t); (t +
1; t+ 1)g.
4 Data and results
In constructing the Malmquist productivity index, the resource constraint (inputs) consists of the
net xed standardized capital stock, labor force measured by the number of workers, and human
capital stock accounted by the average years of schooling of adult population aged 25 and over. As
an output, we take real GDP measured by purchasing parity adjusted in 1996 prices. Data on the
capital stock, labor, and real GDP are drawn from a recent data set in Marquetti (2004). Barro
and Lee (2001) is the source for human capital stock data6. The annual panel data set includes 20
Latin American and Caribbean countries and 18 European and North American countries. Time
period considered is 35 years, from 1966 to 2000.
In the rst three columns of Table 3, we report the mean annual changes in productivity growth,
e¢ ciency change, and technological change from 1966 to 2000. Except for United Kingdom and
Portugal, all European and North American countries improved their productivity during the time
period considered. On average, Italy, Finland, and Norway are the best performers. The main
source of the productivity growth in European and North American countries is the technological
change component, which increased annually by almost 0.6% in North America and 0.8% in Europe,
while the technical e¢ ciency change component actually decreased annually by 0.1% in North
America but increased 0.5% in Europe.
In contrast, main source of the productivity growth in LAC countries is the e¢ ciency change.
On average, it increased annually by 0.1% in Latin American countries and 0.2% in Caribbean
6Barro and Lee (2001) provide this datum for every ve years. Following Maudos, Pastor, and Serrano
(1999) intermediate years have been estimated by interpolation.
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countries, while technological change component decreased by 0.2% in Latin American countries
but increased by 0.2% in Caribbean countries. Jamaica, Venezuela, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Mexico,
Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica are the LAC countries, in which productivity deterioration
is observed. Ecuador is the best performer among LAC countries averaging 1.3% productivity
growth per year.
In Table 3, we also report the cumulative Malmquist index and its components from 1966
to 2000 by sequential multiplication of improvements in each year. In terms of ranking and the
productivity performance of the countries the results are virtually the same compared with the
mean Malmquist index. The main component of long-run productivity growth in LAC countries
appears to be the e¢ ciency change while for European and North American countries, technological
change remains to be the main component of the productivity growth. On average, for the time
period considered, European countries improved their productivity by 55% while North American
countries improved by 19.6%. On the other hand, Latin Americas low TFP growth performance is
clearly indicated by the 4.2% deterioration of the Malmquist index. However, Caribbean countries
on average improved their productivity by 12%.
Figure 1 provides a clear exposition of long-run productivity performance of North American,
European, Latin American and Caribbean countries. For expositional purposes, we normalize the
Malmquist productivity growth index of all countries to unity for 1966. European productivity
exhibits an upward trend from 1966 to 2000 with the exception of the periods 1974 to 1975, 1980
to 1983, and 1990 to 1993. North American productivity growth uctuates over the time period
considered. However, it trends upwards after 1983 with an exception of the period 1989 to 1991.
Similarly, Caribbean TFP growth uctuates over time but boosts after 1986. Recent stagnation
periods in Caribbean region include 1991 to 1994 and 1996 to 1997. Finally, for Latin America,
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productivity growth declines until 1983 and then rises until 1994. However, a rapid decline after
1994 results an over all negative productivity growth performance for the region.
Hence, our main conclusion from our analysis in this section is that innovation is the main
source of productivity growth in European and North American countries. On the other hand, LAC
countries su¤er from ine¢ cient production and lack of innovation. However, through international
di¤usion of knowledge, they use the opportunity to replicate the new technologies produced and
hence grow mostly due to adaptation, i.e., through technical e¢ ciency change. In addition, human
capital stock is an important factor in explaining the productivity growth7, but it is not the key
factor in understanding the long standing TFP growth gap between LAC countries and the rest of
the Western region.
5 Policies, institutions, and growth
Since both LAC countries and European and North American countries share the same best prac-
tice frontier constructed over the whole sample, they have equal access to available technology and
knowledge. Yet, considerable variation in the technological change, e¢ ciency change, and produc-
tivity growth still exist among these countries. In this section, we will discuss how much of this
variation can be accounted for by di¤erences in country-level policies and institutions.
Following the earlier studies of the institutions and economic growth literature, we use two dif-
ferent proxies to account for the institutional quality, namely ICRG composite country risk ratings
and the equally weighted average of political and civil liberty indices. Data for ICRG composite
risk are taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004). This index was originally
constructed by Political Risk Service Group based on 22 components of risk with three subcate-
7The inclusion of the human capital as an input to the DEA model is tested following Banker (1996).
This test indicates that inclusion of human capital to the model is statistically signicant at 1% level.
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gories of risk namely political, nancial and economic. In computing the index, political risk has the
highest weight and includes many components accounting for government stability, socioeconomic
conditions, corruption, law and order, democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality, internal and
external conicts, and military in politics.
On the other hand, Freedom House (2005) is the source for the civil and political liberty indices.
Scores of individual countries in civil liberty index depend on various determinants of civil liberty
including but not limited to freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Political liberty index, on the
other hand, is the proxy for political rights including right to vote, compete for public o¢ ce, and
elect representatives, who have a decisive impact on public policies.
In Table 4, we present mean ICRG composite risk ratings and the weighted average of civil
and political liberty indices for our sample countries8. It is evident that European and North
American countries have achieved a lot more in terms of civil and political liberty and political
institutions compared to that of LAC countries with an exception of Greece and Spain. Costa
Rica appears to be the best performer among LAC countries. Note that Costa Rica is a Central
American success story. Although it is largely an agricultural country, it has recently expanded its
economy to include technology and tourism sectors. The standard of living is relatively high and
land ownership is widespread. In a similar manner, Trinidad Tobago is the best performer of the
Caribbean region. It is one of the wealthiest countries in the Caribbean thanks to petroleum and
natural gas production and processing. Its economy benets from low ination and a growing trade
8Our data for ICRG composite risk ratings cover the period from 1984 to 2000 while civil liberty index is
available from 1972 to 2000. For a complete discussion of the construction of ICRG composite risk rating, see
http://www.ICRGonline.com. For a complete discussion of the construction of the civil and political liberty
index, see http://www.freedomhouse.org. Civil and political liberty indices were originally constructed with
the values ranged from 1 to 7 with 1 being the most liberated. Values were transformed such that 7 became
the most liberated and 1 the least liberated.
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surplus9. In the light of the simple tabulations of Table 4, our hypothesis is that civil and political
liberties, country-level policies, and institutional quality are positively associated with long-run
productivity growth and the economic success of countries.
We start investigating the relationship between instutions and productivity growth using a panel
regression framework. This methodology has an advantage of controlling the unobserved hetere-
ogeity that is generated by country level di¤erences and time. However, it yields biased estimates if
instutional quality measures are still correlated with the error term after the heterogeity of time and
country e¤ects are controlled for. Our dependent variables are the Malmquist indices accounting
for productivity growth, technological change, and e¢ ciency change, respectively. Apart from the
proxies for instutional quality, we use a set of control variables, such as GDP per worker, capital
stock per worker, human capital, share of agriculture and manufacturing industries in GDP, popu-
lation density, and ination rate10. The estimation results for relying on xed and random e¤ects
are reported in Table 5. Hausman test indicates that random e¤ects is the appropriate estimation
strategy when the dependent variable is the productivity growth measured by the Malmquist in-
dex. However, xed e¤ects are preferred when dependent variables are technological change and
e¢ ciency change. The most striking result is that the coe¢ cient on human capital is insignicant
in all regressions. This result is in line with our previous ndings that human capital is not primary
factor in LAC countries long-run economic stagnation. Furhermore, GDP per worker and share of
manufacturing in GDP are positively, ination rate is negatively associated not only with long-run
productivity growth but also innovation and adaptation components of the Malmquist productivity
growth index. The instutional quality measures do not have a signicant e¤ect on the productivity
9A detailed discussion of Costa Ricas and Trinidad Tobagos economic success is presented in CIA World
Factbook (2005).
10The source of this data is World Bank Development Indicators (2004). Natural logarithm of ination
rate and GDP per worker is used in the estimations.
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growth. Civil and political liberties, however, positively a¤ect the technological change.
In Table 6, we investigate the relationship between instutional quality measures and productivity
growth using an alternative methodology, which relies on identifying instruments. Our hypothesis
in this analysis is that institutional quality is the only fundamental determinant of the long-run
economic growth and technological change does not mean to omit the other determinants of growth
such as ination rate, share of manufacture and agriculture in GDP, and other characteristics of the
economy. Following Hall and Jones (1999), we suggest that these variables are the outcomes, which
are determined by the institutions, rather than being the determinants of the economic growth.
We use a set of instruments employed by Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002). These are the extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe as
spoken as rst languages today and indigenous population density and settler mortality rate in 1500.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) argues that the extent of settler mortality caused
by the disease environment in colonies resulted in settler populations of di¤ering sizes. Settler
populations of smaller size tended to be more exploitative, and this was reected in the institutions
they created. Hence, indigenous population density and settler mortality rate are correlated with
the Western inuence on the countries that they conquered and colonized at the fteenth century
and proved to a¤ect productivity growth only through intuitional quality measures11. Hall and
Jones (1999) argues that Western countries adapted their own languages to the countries they
colonized during the same period. Hence, this measure is also correlared with instutions and
political liberty. We formally test the validity of these instruments using over identication tests12.
11We use the log of settler mortality rate and population density in 1500 as in Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002). See, Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) for
a detailed discussion of the instruments.
12Note that since proposed instruments do not vary over time, we cannot account for the panel structure
of the data. Hence, we estimate pooled OLS with appropriate instruments. This is the standart practice in
the literature.
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In Table 6, simple pooled OLS regressions show that intuitions as measured by two distinct
proxy measures of instutions not only a¤ect the productivity growth of the countries positively, but
also positively and signicantly a¤ect the technological change component of the Malmquist index.
On the other hand, they have no signicant e¤ect on the e¢ ciency change component. This nding
is consistent with our earlier ndings that European and North American countries, thanks to their
strong institutional quality, grow mostly due to the innovation of the new technologies. Alternative
IV estimation also yields virtually the same results, but with some exceptions. Although the
coe¢ cient estimate of ICRG country risk ratings is still positive, it does not signicantly a¤ect the
technological change. First stage F-tests and over identication tests imply that our instruments are
valid in all cases except the 2SLS regression of ICRG ratings on the e¢ ciency change component.
The elasticity parameters presented in Table 7 suggests that a one percentage point increase
in the institutional quality as measured by the civil and political liberty index increases the pro-
ductivity growth as measured by the Malmquist index by around 0.03 percentage points13. Similar
results prevail if we instead consider the ICRG risk ratings as our preferred institutional quality
measure. A one percentage point increase in this variable increases the productivity growth by
around 0.04 percentage points. In addition, we report that a one percentage point increase in the
institutional quality increases the technological change component by approximately 0.02 percent-
age points. These results imply that instutions and political liberty have a considerable impact on
LAC countriesproductivity growth trends through technological change.
13Note that, a one unit increase in the civil and political liberty index refers approximately to 14% increase
in this index. Hence, a one unit increase in the civil and political liberty index increases the productivity
growth by around 0:03 14 = 0:42 percentage points.
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6 Conclusion
Using a nonparametric Malmquist productivity growth index, this study rst measures productivity
growth for LAC countries during the 1966-2000 period. Then it compares the results to those of
a peer group of European and North American countries to provide a benchmark for what LAC
countries could have possibly achieved over the last four decades of the century. We argue that
our comparisons are relevant since almost all of the LAC countries are colonized and populated by
individuals of European descent, who established the Western culture and economic success.
Our results indicate, on average, 55% productivity growth for Europe and 20% productivity
growth for North America compared with that of 12% productivity growth of Caribbean and 4.2%
productivity deterioration of Latin America for the time period considered. We report that LAC
countries su¤er from ine¢ cient production and lack of innovation. However, through international
di¤usion of knowledge, they use the opportunity to replicate the new technologies produced and
hence grow mostly due to adaptation. Hence, their productivity growth mostly comes from technical
e¢ ciency change rather than the technological change component of the Malmquist productivity
growth index.
In a policy viewpoint, our study is the rst that investigated the e¤ect of institutions on eco-
nomic growth and technological change, using a non-parametric measure of economic growth. We
also explicitly recognize the endogeneity and measurement error of the institutional quality mea-
sures on the economic outcomes. We show that human capital di¤erence is not the key factor in
explaining poor productivity growth performance of LAC countries. However, our results suggest
that institutional quality is an important determinant of long-run productivity growth.
In particular, we conclude that the policies related to improving economic freedom, civil rights,
institutions, law and order, and other components of civil, economic, and political liberty positively
17
contribute not only to the productivity growth, but also to the technological improvement of the
countries.
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Tables 
Table 1. Cultural, religious, and language characteristics of LAC countries  
Country Descent Religion Language
Latin America
Argentina 97% 96% Spanish, English, Italian, German, French
Bolivia 45% 95% Spanish, Quechua, Aymara
Brazil 93% 80% Portuguese, Spanish, English, French
Chile 95% 100% Spanish
Colombia 92% 94% Spanish
Costa Rica 94% 92% Spanish, English
Ecuador 65% 92% Spanish, Quecha
El Salvador 99% 83% Spanish, Nahua
Guatemala 57% 90% Spanish, Amerindian Languages
Honduras 91% 100% Spanish, Amerindian Languages
Mexico 69% 95% Spanish, Amerindian Languages
Nicaragua 84% 100% Spanish, English, Indigeneous Languages
Panama 80% 100% Spanish, English
Paraguay 95% 90% Spanish, Guarani
Peru 52% 90% Spanish, Quechua
Uruguay 88% 67% Spanish, Portunol or Brazilero (Portuguese-Spanish mix)
Venezuela 89% 98% Spanish, Indigeneous Languages
Mean 81% 92%
Caribbean
Dominican Rep. 89% 95% Spanish
Jamaica 8% 65% English
Trinidad&Tobago 20% 39% English, Hindi, French, Spanish
Mean 39% 66%
 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2005). 
Notes:  
i) Descent is the fraction of total population that is white or mixed-white.  
ii) Religion is the fraction of total population affiliated with Western religions such as Christianity and Judaism. 
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Table 2. Main macroeconomic indicators of LAC, European and North American 
countries relative to U.S 
 
Country 1966 1983 2000 1966 1983 2000 1966 1983 2000 1966 1983 2000
Latin America
Argentina 0.525 0.425 0.349 0.559 0.576 0.398 0.672 0.671 0.300 0.571 0.568 0.693
Bolivia 0.182 0.125 0.083 0.227 0.195 0.106 0.185 0.106 0.051 0.409 0.349 0.452
Brazil 0.187 0.263 0.222 0.239 0.351 0.298 0.308 0.445 0.240 0.300 0.265 0.372
Chile 0.297 0.214 0.305 0.387 0.301 0.389 0.488 0.202 0.350 0.525 0.510 0.644
Colombia 0.183 0.196 0.166 0.252 0.303 0.178 0.194 0.181 0.104 0.297 0.345 0.409
Costa Rica 0.248 0.211 0.181 0.336 0.297 0.230 0.234 0.238 0.164 0.405 0.424 0.491
Ecuador 0.136 0.183 0.109 0.178 0.295 0.169 0.290 0.340 0.135 0.324 0.464 0.532
El Salvador 0.262 0.165 0.138 0.332 0.244 0.210 0.132 0.112 0.081 0.201 0.287 0.367
Guatemala 0.172 0.174 0.120 0.234 0.298 0.206 0.126 0.139 0.075 0.154 0.204 0.255
Honduras 0.118 0.106 0.063 0.160 0.175 0.099 0.101 0.097 0.080 0.179 0.260 0.333
Mexico 0.306 0.343 0.267 0.459 0.525 0.381 0.501 0.498 0.331 0.287 0.365 0.549
Nicaragua 0.247 0.148 0.054 0.336 0.240 0.084 0.192 0.144 0.058 0.250 0.259 0.361
Panama 0.207 0.260 0.187 0.257 0.370 0.246 0.263 0.358 0.268 0.452 0.517 0.645
Paraguay 0.165 0.209 0.150 0.210 0.308 0.162 0.087 0.201 0.098 0.357 0.404 0.469
Peru 0.282 0.203 0.140 0.387 0.317 0.156 0.773 0.335 0.141 0.348 0.470 0.598
Uruguay 0.374 0.296 0.297 0.389 0.371 0.328 0.359 0.359 0.180 0.520 0.527 0.592
Venezuela 0.620 0.336 0.197 0.867 0.487 0.275 0.932 0.597 0.198 0.274 0.437 0.458
Mean 0.265 0.227 0.178 0.342 0.333 0.230 0.343 0.295 0.168 0.344 0.391 0.484
Caribbean
Dominican Rep. 0.116 0.146 0.162 0.174 0.247 0.251 0.098 0.164 0.134 0.255 0.307 0.422
Jamaica 0.216 0.158 0.116 0.230 0.170 0.113 0.359 0.180 0.109 0.280 0.332 0.426
Trinidad&Tobago 0.380 0.479 0.347 0.476 0.626 0.419 0.275 0.390 0.179 0.465 0.549 0.622
Mean 0.237 0.261 0.208 0.293 0.347 0.261 0.244 0.245 0.141 0.334 0.396 0.490
Europe
Austria 0.604 0.759 0.737 0.567 0.806 0.784 0.889 1.150 0.960 0.740 0.706 0.718
Belgium 0.654 0.752 0.728 0.721 0.900 0.879 1.238 1.154 0.992 0.835 0.682 0.713
Denmark 0.914 0.868 0.818 0.806 0.788 0.787 1.244 1.024 0.850 0.945 0.790 0.824
Finland 0.610 0.765 0.732 0.541 0.740 0.755 1.003 1.068 0.782 0.633 0.687 0.828
France 0.685 0.804 0.705 0.651 0.857 0.761 0.962 1.131 0.888 0.626 0.602 0.683
Greece 0.416 0.516 0.448 0.438 0.659 0.546 0.695 1.027 0.548 0.534 0.576 0.695
Iceland 0.740 0.838 0.766 0.737 0.785 0.698 1.295 1.129 0.776 0.636 0.625 0.714
Ireland 0.393 0.476 0.806 0.424 0.619 1.008 0.388 0.611 0.766 0.691 0.658 0.736
Italy 0.584 0.719 0.670 0.608 0.895 0.836 1.160 1.186 0.902 0.519 0.474 0.571
Netherlands 0.720 0.737 0.749 0.838 0.908 0.809 1.398 1.221 0.850 0.639 0.694 0.754
Norway 0.656 0.807 0.832 0.673 0.809 0.837 1.498 1.451 1.095 0.686 0.708 0.968
Portugal 0.297 0.428 0.485 0.329 0.470 0.542 0.390 0.503 0.620 0.244 0.293 0.401
Spain 0.489 0.539 0.547 0.556 0.748 0.684 0.763 1.007 0.783 0.421 0.445 0.592
Sweden 0.832 0.811 0.727 0.764 0.784 0.704 1.251 0.938 0.693 0.814 0.791 0.927
Switzerland 1.166 1.028 0.813 1.029 1.009 0.735 2.047 1.516 1.003 0.803 0.845 0.848
United Kingdom 0.717 0.694 0.692 0.647 0.699 0.692 0.799 0.664 0.638 0.777 0.707 0.763
Mean 0.655 0.721 0.703 0.646 0.780 0.754 1.064 1.049 0.822 0.659 0.643 0.734
North America
Canada 0.849 0.869 0.826 0.898 0.858 0.810 1.110 0.976 0.931 0.878 0.876 0.933
USA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
GDP per capita GDP per worker Capital per worker Schooling
 
Notes: 
i) USA=1 for all figures. 
ii) Schooling: Average years of schooling for adult population aged 25 and greater. 
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Table 3. Malmquist index and its decomposition 
 
Country Efficiency Technological Index Efficiency Technological Index Rank
Latin America
Argentina 1.008 0.994 1.002 1.304 0.814 1.063 28
Bolivia 1.007 0.999 1.006 1.266 0.965 1.228 16
Brazil 1.008 0.995 1.003 1.320 0.835 1.109 24
Chile 1.008 0.998 1.005 1.297 0.923 1.194 20
Colombia 1.000 1.002 1.002 1.000 1.065 1.065 27
Costa Rica 0.997 1.002 0.999 0.896 1.089 0.974 31
Ecuador 1.013 0.999 1.013 1.557 0.981 1.529 9
El Salvador 0.999 0.996 0.995 0.964 0.883 0.851 34
Guatemala 1.001 1.004 1.004 1.018 1.129 1.149 23
Honduras 0.991 0.992 0.983 0.734 0.769 0.567 36
Mexico 1.003 0.994 0.997 1.100 0.814 0.896 33
Nicaragua 0.986 0.996 0.981 0.612 0.862 0.525 37
Panama 0.998 1.004 1.002 0.927 1.147 1.065 26
Paraguay 0.990 0.991 0.980 0.701 0.726 0.509 38
Peru 1.009 0.996 1.005 1.355 0.872 1.178 22
Uruguay 1.006 1.001 1.007 1.235 1.033 1.277 15
Venezuela 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.989 0.843 0.834 35
Mean 1.001 0.998 0.999 1.043 0.918 0.958 N/A
Caribbean
Dominican Rep. 1.007 0.999 1.006 1.276 0.960 1.223 19
Jamaica 0.999 1.001 0.999 0.954 1.021 0.972 32
Trinidad&Tobago 1.000 1.005 1.005 1.000 1.183 1.183 21
Mean 1.002 1.002 1.003 1.068 1.050 1.120 N/A
North America
Canada 0.998 1.005 1.003 0.943 1.173 1.103 25
USA 1.000 1.008 1.008 1.000 1.298 1.298 14
Mean 0.999 1.006 1.005 0.971 1.234 1.196 N/A
Europe
Austria 1.007 1.013 1.020 1.269 1.537 1.952 4
Belgium 1.006 1.013 1.019 1.225 1.566 1.918 5
Denmark 1.000 1.011 1.010 0.983 1.433 1.408 12
Finland 1.011 1.011 1.022 1.468 1.436 2.104 2
France 1.007 1.011 1.018 1.251 1.465 1.834 6
Greece 1.010 1.004 1.015 1.429 1.165 1.658 7
Iceland 0.998 1.016 1.014 0.946 1.692 1.602 8
Ireland 1.007 1.004 1.012 1.276 1.156 1.478 10
Italy 1.012 1.013 1.025 1.495 1.535 2.290 1
Netherlands 1.002 1.009 1.011 1.071 1.367 1.466 11
Norway 1.007 1.015 1.022 1.250 1.670 2.083 3
Portugal 1.002 0.997 0.999 1.086 0.897 0.974 30
Spain 1.005 1.001 1.006 1.182 1.039 1.226 17
Sweden 1.004 1.006 1.010 1.132 1.228 1.390 13
Switzerland 0.991 1.015 1.006 0.732 1.669 1.224 18
United Kingdom 1.007 0.992 0.999 1.271 0.773 0.982 29
Mean 1.005 1.008 1.013 1.174 1.321 1.550 N/A
Mean Cumulative
 
Notes: 
i) Mean: Mean annual productivity growth, efficiency change, and technological change from 1966 to 2000. Cumulative: 
Cumulative productivity, efficiency change, and technological change from 1966 to 2000. 
ii) Index: Malmquist productivity growth index. Efficiency: Efficiency change index. Technological: Technological change 
index. 
iii) Geometric means are reported. 
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Table 4. Mean ICRG risk ratings and civil and political liberty index  
 
ICRG risk rating Civil and Political Liberty ICRG risk rating Civil and Political Liberty
Latin America Europe
Argentina 60.18 5.05 Austria 85.59 7.00
(13.46) (1.39) (2.21) (0.0)
Bolivia 54.56 4.86 Belgium 81.45 6.89
(14.80) (1.23) (2.28) (0.21)
Brazil 61.07 4.72 Denmark 84.70 7.00
(5.07) 0.85 (2.37) (0.0)
Chile 67.68 4.09 Finland 84.28 6.48
(11.89) (1.82) (2.74) (0.49)
Colombia 60.96 5.05 France 80.40 6.52
(5.34) (0.69) (1.60) (0.09)
Costa Rica 67.39 6.84 Greece 67.53 5.86
(7.81) (0.24) (7.61) (1.09)
Ecuador 56.55 4.93 Iceland 80.12 7.00
(5.12) (1.24) (2.58) (0.0)
El Salvador 55.45 4.71 Ireland 81.64 6.90
(16.06) (0.80) (3.94) (0.21)
Guatemala 53.93 4.07 Italy 78.21 6.57
(12.04) (0.94) (2.94) (0.32)
Honduras 52.86 4.74 Netherlands 87.43 7.00
(7.45) (0.86) (1.81) (0.0)
Mexico 66.39 4.38 Norway 87.71 7.00
(6.55) (0.39) (2.26) (0.0)
Nicaragua 43.11 3.76 Portugal 77.70 6.15
(12.30) (0.95) (5.01) (1.27)
Panama 60.58 3.86 Spain 76.09 5.86
(9.18) 1.68 (3.34) (1.39)
Paraguay 63.18 3.62 Sweden 83.69 6.98
(9.03) (0.95) (2.29) (0.09)
Peru 52.31 4.07 Switzerland 90.81 7.00
(12.40) (1.26) (2.79) (0.0)
Uruguay 66.78 4.93 United Kingdom 82.25 6.79
(5.38) (1.81) (2.20) (0.25)
Venezuela 64.99 5.81
(5.10) (0.82)
Caribbean North America
Dominican Rep. 59.62 5.52 Canada 83.84 7.00
(10.63) (0.56) (1.50) (0.0)
Jamaica 64.43 5.81 United States 84.01 7.00
(8.16) (0.36) (1.89) (0.0)
Trinidad&Tobago 65.52 6.38
(6.92) (0.49)
LAC Countries European and North American Countries
 
 
Notes: 
i) Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
ii) ICRG risk rating: ICRG composite risk rating with 0=highest risk to 100=lowest (World Development Indicators, 
World Bank, 2004). 
iii) Civil and political liberty: Computed as the weighted average of political liberty index and civil liberty index with 
0=lowest to 7=highest (Freedom House, Freedom in the world, 2005). 
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Table 5. Determinants of Productivity growth, technological change, and efficiency 
change 
Independent Variables Fixed effects
Random 
effects Fixed effects
Random 
effects Fixed effects
Random 
effects
Constant 0.591*** 0.871*** 0.745*** 0.907*** 0.838*** 0.936***
(0.181) (0.049) (0.127) (0.033) (0.176) (0.046)
GDP per worker 0.131*** 0.042*** 0.083*** 0.019*** 0.049** 0.021**
(0.021) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.021) (0.009)
Capital stock per worker -0.092*** -0.025*** -0.054*** -0.009** -0.038** -0.015**
(0.017) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.017) (0.006)
Human capital -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Share of manufacturing 0.002** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Share of agriculture 0.002** -0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.002** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Population density×100 0.035 -0.004** -0.031 -0.001 0.066* -0.003
(0.040) (0.002) (0.028) (0.001) (0.039) (0.002)
Inflation rate -0.010*** -0.004*** 0.003** -0.000 -0.010*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ICRG Risk Rating×100 -0.035 -0.031 0.002 -0.021 -0.036 -0.010
(0.036) (0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.034) (0.024)
Civil and Political Liberty 0.003 0.003 0.004* 0.004** -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Hausman Test (p-value) 28.42 - 36.35 - 46.37 -
(0.243) (0.066) (0.004)
R2 0.180 0.123 0.230 0.191 0.187 0.145
Number of Obs. 535 535 535 535 535 535
Independent Variables
Productivity Growth Technological Change Efficiency Change
 
Notes: 
i) Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
ii) The sign *** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at 1% significance level. The sign ** indicates that 
the variable is statistically significant at 5% significance level. The sign * indicates that the variable is statistically 
significant at 10% significance level. 
iii) Time effects are included in all regressions. 
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Table 6. Relationship between institutions and productivity growth, technological change, 
and efficiency change 
 
OLS 2SLS
Over ID test 
(p-value) OLS 2SLS
Over ID test 
(p-value) OLS 2SLS
Over ID test 
(p-value)
Proxy for Instutions
Civil and Political Liberty 0.003*** 0.005* 0.290 0.004*** 0.003 0.565 -0.0001 0.002 0.676
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
First stage R2 0.015 0.164 0.038 0.165 0.001 0.164
First stage F-test 16.35 41.67 43.34 41.67 0.98 41.67
Number of Observations 1102 638 1102 638 1102 638
Proxy for Instutions
ICRG Country Risk Ratings 0.0002** 0.001* 0.247 0.0002** 0.0002 0.837 0.00004 0.0004 0.098
(0.0001) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
First stage R2 0.007 0.290 0.008 0.289 0.0003 0.290
First stage F-test 4.90 50.29 5.61 50.29 0.20 50.29
Number of Observations 646 374 646 374 646 374
Productivity Growth Technological Change (Innovation) Effficiency Change (Adaptation)
 
Notes: 
i) Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
ii) The sign *** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at 1% significance level. The sign ** indicates that the variable is 
statistically significant at 5% significance level. The sign * indicates that the variable is statistically significant at 10% significance 
level. 
iii) All regressions include a constant. 
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Table 7. Coefficients of Elasticities under different specifications 
Proxy for Instutions OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Civil and Political Liberty 0.019*** 0.026* 0.023*** 0.016 -0.005 0.008
(0.005) (0.016) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.015)
ICRG Country Risk Ratings 0.016** 0.037* 0.012** 0.011 0.003 0.025
(0.007) (0.021) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007) (0.019)
Productivity Growth Technological Change Efficiency Change
 
Notes: 
i) Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
ii) The sign *** indicates that the variable is statistically significant at 1% significance level. The sign ** indicates that the variable is 
statistically significant at 5% significance level. The sign * indicates that the variable is statistically significant at 10% significance 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29
Figure 1. Long-run productivity growth trends 
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